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JUDGE DENISON AND THE COLORADO CODE
By R. HICKMAN WALKER, of the Denver Bar
Ex-associate Justice, Supreme Court, State of Colorado

JOHN

H. DENISON, graduate of the University of Vermont, and of the Harvard Law School, a member of the
Denver Bar since 1881, a judge of the Denver District
Court for six years, a justice of the Colorado Supreme Court
for ten years, one being as Chief Justice, professor of pleading
at Denver Law School for 35 years, and occasional lecturer at
other schools as well as writer upon the subject, was attracted,
throughout his long and fruitful career, by the logical qualities of the unemotional field of legal pleading, studied in that
field critically and constructively, and, in addition to the less
tangible influences of his labors as practitioner, teacher and
nisi prius judge, left permanent contributions to that branch
of adjective law, in his decisions from the Supreme bench and
his book now near publication, entitled "Code Pleading in
Colorado." In ten years as a Supreme Justice, he wrote the
opinion of the court in nearly 600 cases, and of these, approximately 160 dealt, in whole or in part, with questions of Code
pleading and practice. In "Code Pleading in Colorado," due
to issue this week from the Courtright press, Judge Denison,
who corrected the final copy just before his death in the fall
of 1935, leaves to the Bar of Colorado-and I think the Bar
of the English-speaking world will also claim a share in the
legacy-a volume of 750 pages, carrying citations of 2500
different Colorado cases, with concise text, critical comment
and illustrative forms, incarnating the productive labors of a
lifetime,"Of his practice, the dearest issue,
And of his old experience, the only darling."
Of the book, let me say that it is what the publisher
claims it to be, a monumental work, and especially when one
considers that the subject matter and its citations are limited
to the single jurisdiction of Colorado. In his preface, dated
October 9th, 1935, Judge Denison says that the object of the
book is to show "what Code pleading is in Colorado and
what it logically ought to be,"-a wide gap indeed. This
object he pursues through 66 chapters, combining the methods of textbook, encyclopedia and digest, descending to the
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minutest detail and rising to the broadest principle in the
treatment of every conceivable question involving pleadings,
motions, types of action (not, however, including practice),
that has arisen in Colorado, embracing also special and statutory proceedings. Moreover, he supplies 100 forms. The
work bears the impress of his unmistakable talent for condensation, and the style is that frugal, inornate one which
made the syllabus of many of his opinions in the Supreme
Court almost as long as the opinion itself. And everywhere
present in the book is Denison, the relentless analyst, Denison,
the legal antiquarian, Denison, the thorough scholar, and
Denison, the candid.
On the Supreme bench, Judge Denison had a commonlaw mind, and a Code conscience. The Code he regarded as
having the effect of law. In his opinions, I find no trace of
the theory, later prominent upon that bench, that the Code is
persuasive, but not binding-that it is an elaborate suggestion from an impotent, if not impertinent, source. On the
contrary, Judge Denison remarks, in Williams vs. Stringfield
(76 Colorado 343), almost naively, one would say: "However that may be, the Code must govern us." Wondering,
apparently, if the courts would not obey the Code, how could
lawyers be expected to. Not only did he regard it as law, but,
while he did not regard it as ideal, neither did he consider it an
ideal, like Christian precepts, to be satisfied by a loose approximation. He read in the Code, as plainly as if in terms therein
expressed, from its prescription for "facts constituting the
cause of action," and for "ordinary concise language," and
from its definition of a "material allegation," and of "issues,"
and from its general scheme, the cardinal rule that only ultimate facts are to be pleaded, to the strict exclusion of evidentiary matter and conclusions of law. This was to him the key
of the arch, and upon violators of this rule, almost equal in
number to the membership of the Colorado Bar, he fell with
cold and incisive fury. The disregard of this rule he attributes, in his book, in part to the influence of Judge Victor A.
Elliott, who, first upon the Denver district and afterwards on
the Supreme bench, favored the use, under the Code, of the
equity methods of pleading for disclosure, rather than the
common law method of pleading for issue-which latter
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Denison says was clearly the Code object in all classes of cases.
Against the pleading of evidentiary matter, conclusions of
law, argument, hope and what not, he is able in his book to
cite an astonishing array of Supreme and Court of Appeals
decisions or dicta, and, whether he cites them all or not I do
not know, but he might include in the list no less than twenty-five of his own opinions in which he fulminates against
this universal vice, with growing impatience and gathering
despair, exclaiming in 77 Colo., "It is an elementary rule of
pleading-a rule more often ignored than obeyed, but a rule,"
and, in 80 Colo., "We are tired of citing the Colorado authorities on this point-they begin with Sylvis v. Sylvis, 11 Colorado." The rules of statement, given constant lip-service, had
hung for years like the birch on the wall, more in terror than
in use, but Denison took the rod down and began gleefully to
lay about him among the spoiled and now amazed children.
In his second year on the Supreme bench, he found no obscure
offender in Adams and Gast, of Pueblo, and because, instead
of pleading that the plaintiff and defendant made a contract,
or that the defendant, in consideration, etc., undertook and
promised (approved forms unquestioned for centuries, Denison says), they pleaded that the plaintiff made to defendant a
proposition (stating it), and the defendant accepted it, Denison affirms a judgment against them on the pleadings, disregarding also their supplications for trial, upon denials of
conclusions of law and denials of anticipated defenses. (Swanson Co. vs. Investment Co., 70 Colo. 83.) On the day
Swanson Co. vs. Opera House Co. was handed down, the
law of pleading in Colorado was a living thing. Yet Judge
Denison was candid enough to admit that when the judicial spectroscope was trained on a complaint, it was not
always easy to say which allegations lay within the spectrum
of ultimate fact and which ran over into the infra-red of
evidence on one side and which into the ultra-violet of legal
conclusions on the other. He was driven early to say that
"perhaps the only way to determine what is ultimate fact
is by precedent," (67 Colo. 315)-a view which he expands
in his book. He did his part toward establishing precedent
in this regard. In fact, with a keen and well-founded apprehension of the richness of the field to be cultivated, he
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was not at all averse from the didactic in his deliverances
upon questions of pleadings. In a score of instances, he sends
the bar, as well as its unlucky exponent in the particular
case, to Chitty or Archbold or Estes, or, in many cases, furnishes the language and the form in extenso, for whole complaints or defenses, as well as for particular allegations and
denials, and often sends the case back for complete repleading.
If your action is in replevin, conversion, deceit, quiet title,
contract, trespass to land or goods, seizure of exempt property, automobile negligence, alienation, criminal conversation,
Denison has done your work for you, if you will only let him,
in 65 to 85 Colorado, besides furnishing you innumerable
ultimate fact sentences and phrases. In doing so, his clipped
style results in some arresting sentences, as where, in Foley vs.
Gavin (76 Colo. 287), he says: "Marriage is an ultimate
fact,"-in defiance, it would seem, of divorce statistics.
Judge Denison, notwithstanding he was thoroughly
grounded in common-law pleading and had an intense admiration for its insistence upon accurate analysis and uniformity
of statement, and that his reputation in that regard extended
as far as England, did not, in the Code Canaan, or, if you
prefer, the Code Wilderness, put in much time sighing for the
fleshpots of the discarded system. In his book, he says that
lawyers have made the Code less simple than it really. is.
Neither in his book nor in his opinions, will you find any
encomiums upon the Code, such as you will find in Pomeroy,
whom Denison loved to cite. Nevertheless, the abolition of
forms of actions, and of the distinctions between legal and
equitable proceedings, Denison accepts ungrudgingly. In 74
Colorado (Clay R. Co. vs. Martinez, at page 10), he says,
arguendo, "To hold otherwise would be to revert to commonlaw forms of action now happily abolished." We cannot suspect him of satire. In 78 Colorado (Ry. Conductors vs.
Jones, at page 88), in holding it was no error for the trial
court to refuse to rule whether an action was legal or equitable, he emphasizes that the evidence and the rules of evidence
are the same, and asks, evidently in a skeptical moment, "If
the Code has not abolished the label, what has it abolished?"
adding, "We should stultify it." In Conroy vs. Cover (80
Colo. 434), now grown into a leading case, he maintained,

DICTA

155

under Code provisions and with an invocation of the spirit of
the Code, not unusual with him, the right of the court to
grant relief to certain of the cestuis que trustent, notwithstanding the absence from the jurisdiction of others of them
who, if present, would be indispensable parties. Many, indeed, are his liberal rulings, in the interest of substantial justice, where logic-a dominating factor in his mind-might
have wrought a different result; as where he refused to give
fatal effect to a corporate misnomer (66 Colo. 173), or to the
absence of a replication, where the issue was treated as existing
(68 Colo. 244), or to a variance (80 Colo. 325), or to the
absence of an essential allegation in the complaint, where the
answer nevertheless denied it, and evidence was taken regarding it (80 Colo. 26), where he upheld a complaint in the
nature of an interpleader, but not within the literal language
of the Code (74 Colo. 452), ruled that a mandamus to issue
70 different tax certificates stated but one cause of action (80
Colo. 325), rejected the metaphysical axiom that you cannot
amend where there is nothing to amend by, and allowed an
action against a dissolved corporation to proceed against the
last acting board (82 Colo. 343), and ruled a plea of "unclean hands" unnecessary to the enforcement of that doctrine
by the court, for whose integrity it was a shield (82 Colo.
75). The spirit of the Code was strong upon him and even
his clinging to the common-law types of statement, his insistence upon the value of precedented forms, his continual use of
the common-law nomenclature, as assumpsit, trespass de
bonis, etc., were designed to prevent the seeds of destruction
which lay in the body of the Code from coming to growth
and harvest. For Judge Denison saw clearly-and in his book
he puts beyond misunderstanding-that a system of pleading
can be of no substantial service to the cause of justice if it
licenses every pleader and every court, under a rule for the
statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary
concise language, to make his own selection, "out of his own
head," as Judge Denison put it-of the ultimate facts, and
the concise and ordinary language-more certain to be ordinary than to be concise-for their statement, so that an identical transaction is, for one pleader, stated as A, for another as
B, and for another as all the letters of the alphabet. He saw,
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with equal clearness, that the so-called common-law classifications of forms of action were not such at all, but were categories of causes of action, as trespass de bonis was an unlawful
taking of goods, though no action were ever brought on it,
and consequently, under the Code, a statement of a trespass de
bonis was just as good a statement of a cause of action as before the Code. As statements of such causes of action, approved and uniform, were available, he welcomed them as
exact compliances with the Code, and as furnishing to the
Code some protection against the tendency to utterly diverse,
ruggedly individualistic, and unsorted pleadings which the
Code, in the hands of a profession not yet universally logical
or analytical, had developed. In his book, he tends to despair:
"Since the Code has thus far failed in its purpose to produce conciseness and directness in pleading and must continue to do so unless
lawyers and courts shall develop customary forms of brevity and directness, which seems but remotely possible, it appears that the best course
would be to adopt the English system; if not wholly at least partially,
i.e.,
in all ordinary cases."

The English system referred to, of course, provides for simple
statements of claim and defense, in language prescribed by the
rule of court, non-demurrable, and leading directly to trial.
Judge Denison would be interested to see-perhaps I should
follow Brisbane and say, Judge Denison will be interested to
see-to what scheme or system the Supreme Court of the
United States, and its advisory committee, now formulating
rules for all civil cases in the Federal district courts, will resort
-a result to be known within a few months, and certain to
be of immense importance in the future development of American pleading.
It is not every jurisdiction the size of Colorado which
produces a matter in any, let alone in so difficult, a department
of the law. In closing, permit me to apostrophize: "Oh,
gentle and guileless spirit, wheresoever in the realms of the
unembodied you now employ that steely and syllogistic mind
upon ultimate fact indeed, be not disturbed to think that we
still make of our complaint our opening statement and of our
replication a closing argument, and anticipate defenses, and
make argumentative denials, and neglect the sweet and commendable common counts. It may be that your 'Code Plead-
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ing in Colorado' will furnish bench and bar the very instrument needed to develop a homogeneous, logical and practicable system of pleading in this tiny mundane jurisdiction,
and thus may so right a genius as yours find full posthumous
vogue.
"SCINTILLATING OMNILUCENCE"
(Journal, American Judicature Society, April, 1936)

A few months ago it was said in this Journal that opposition to
bar integration had been driven to cover; that hostile arguments rarely
appeared in print; and that opponents had retired to the last line of
defense-personal influence with legislators. Shortly after that statement was made there appeared in Dicta, the Denver Bar Association's
sprightly journal (Dec., 1935), an apparently serious argument against
integration. Like all similar arguments it was essentially a priori argument. The writer, Mr. Albert M. Vogl, told of all the evil consequences which would follow compulsory organization. This line of
argument becomes increasingly difficult as the years go by without evidence that any loss whatsoever has come through integration. It has
to ignore all that is pertinent evidence, the history of the state bars
which have been in existence for three years or more.
But the article was notable in introducing a new comparison and
a fresh expression. The author called inclusive organization an effort
to substitute "Boeotian mediocrity for scintillating omnilucence." Such
a phrase is one to be studied, mastered and enshrined in one's inner consciousness. It affords spiritual release in a time of doubt and fear. To
pave the way to appreciation of a linguistic jewel (for "omnilucence"
does not appear in the latest American lexicon) it may be spelled thusomni-lucence-and so explain itself. ("Shining upon all or every.
where," New English Dictionary, Oxford.) One can learn from
Webster that Boeotia was a land in which the natives were notorious
for their stupidity.
Having mastered this expression with a proper sense of achievement, the only question that remains is whether Mr. Vogl has been
kidding his readers. In the succeeding number Dicta published an
affirmative argument, written by Mr. Bentley M. McMullin. Did the
editor of Dicta, in order to present both sides of a question which Colorado lawyers are at last beginning to consider earnestly, assign the
negative to a writer who was willing to comply and do the best he
could?* Such an attitude would be more or less routine to a lawyer.
But the coinage of bright and shining new phrases is not routine-it is
inspiration.
*Oh, Mister! you don't know our Albert Vogl!

